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Derek E. Bambauer* 
 
Abstract 
The 2016 U.S. presidential election is seen as a masterpiece of 
effective disinformation tactics. Commentators credit the Russian 
Federation with a set of targeted, effective information interventions that 
led to the surprise election of Republican candidate Donald Trump. On 
this account, Russia hacked not only America’s voting systems, but also 
American voters, plying them with inaccurate data—especially on Internet 
platforms—that changed political views. 
This Essay examines the 2016 election narrative through the lens of 
cybersecurity; it treats foreign efforts to influence the outcome as 
information hacking. It critically assesses unstated assumptions of the 
narrative, including whether these attacks can be replicated; the size of 
their effect; the role of key influencers in targeted groups; and the 
normative claim that citizens voted against their preferences. Next, the 
Essay offers examples of other successful information hacks and argues 
that these attacks have multiple, occasionally conflicting goals. It uses 
lessons from cybersecurity to analyze possible responses, including 
prevention, remediation, and education. Finally, it draws upon the 
security literature to propose quarantines for suspect information, 
protection of critical human infrastructure, and whitelists as tactics that 




The great danger of lying is not that lies are untruths, and thus unreal, but 
that they become real in other people’s minds. 




The standard account of the 2016 U.S. presidential election is that the Russian 
Federation, at the direction of its President Vladimir Putin, hacked not only voting 
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systems but voters.1 A sophisticated Internet campaign directed carefully crafted 
political disinformation at parts of the American electorate,2 resulting in the election 
of Donald Trump, a candidate with overt sympathies for Russian interests.3 The 
narrowness of the Trump victory—he won three million fewer votes nationwide than 
Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton, and carried three crucial states by fewer than 
eighty thousand votes total4—and the erratic behavior of the resulting 
administration5 have brought disinformation, particularly on social media platforms, 
under sharp scrutiny.6 Commentators have analyzed the finely-honed targeting of 
disinformation to U.S. voters, along with evidence that Russia engaged in selective 
leaking of accurate information, to conclude that this subset of “fake news” changed 
the outcome of the election.7 Some have gone so far as to pinpoint this interference 
                                               
1 See, e.g., Jane Mayer, How Russia Helped Swing the Election for Trump, NEW 
YORKER (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/01/how-russia-
helped-to-swing-the-election-for-trump [https://perma.cc/L9MR-UA86]. 
2 I define “disinformation” in this context to mean data that is known to be false and 
that is distributed with the intent to alter the political positions of voters or groups of voters. 
See generally Samantha Bradshaw & Philip N. Howard, The Global Disinformation Order: 
2019 Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation (U. Oxford Computational 
Propaganda Research Project, Working Paper No. 2019.2, 2019), https://comprop.oii.ox.ac. 
uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/09/CyberTroop-Report19.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU6N 
-XPHX] (analyzing the tools used by governments and political parties to manipulate social 
media). 
3 See, e.g., Marshall Cohen, 25 Times Trump Was Soft on Russia, CNN (Nov. 19, 2019, 
1:48 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/17/politics/trump-soft-on-russia/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/87P5-RXZK]. 
4 See, e.g., Philip Bump, Donald Trump Will Be President Thanks to 80,000 People in 
Three States, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2016, 1:38 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
the-fix/wp/2016/12/01/donald-trump-will-be-president-thanks-to-80000-people-in-three-
states/ [https://perma.cc/9MAP-XJ69]; Gregory Krieg, It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump 
in Popular Vote, CNN (Dec. 22, 2016, 5:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics 
/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-popular-vote-final-count/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z9T5-
W57J]. 
5 See, e.g., Daniel Lippman, Trump Veterans See a Presidency Veering off the Rails, 
POLITICO (Oct. 19, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/19/trump-white-house-
staff-051393 [https://perma.cc/67F6-66ZM]. See also generally, e.g., PETER BERGEN, 
TRUMP AND HIS GENERALS: THE COST OF CHAOS (2019) (focusing on the Trump 
administration’s unorthodox actions in the foreign policy arena). 
6 See Bradshaw & Howard, supra note 2. 
7 See generally, e.g., KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, CYBERWAR: HOW RUSSIAN HACKERS 
AND TROLLS HELPED ELECT A PRESIDENT: WHAT WE DON’T, CAN’T, AND DO KNOW (2018) 
(analyzing the effect that Russian hacking and social media messaging had on the 2016 
presidential election); Young Mie Kim et al., The Stealth Media? Groups and Targets Behind 
Divisive Issue Campaigns on Facebook, 35 POL. COMM. 515 (2018) (discussing the use of 
digital media by anonymous political campaigns to affect the 2016 U.S. elections). The U.S. 
is not the only country facing these challenges. See, e.g., Emilio Ferrara, Disinformation and 
Social Bot Operations in the Run Up to the 2017 French Presidential Election, 22 FIRST 
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as the beginning of the end of U.S. superpower status and the relative Pax Americana 
it generated since the end of the Cold War.8 
There is little if any doubt about Russian intentions.9 The country’s security 
service calculated, correctly, that a Clinton-led administration would pose far more 
opposition to Russian strategic interests than a Trump-led one would.10 
Investigations such as those by Special Counsel Robert Mueller uncovered 
compelling evidence of widespread Russian attempts to sway voters.11 And, the 
outcome was likely better than even the most optimistic predictions of electoral 
interference; the Trump administration has consistently supported Russian interests 
even at significant costs to putative allies, such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization) member states.12 The conventional wisdom is that Russia executed a 
strategic masterpiece. 
Why, then, were the Russians surprised by the Trump victory?13 
The hacking analogy can help us to answer this question. There are many ways 
to find and exploit vulnerabilities—bugs—in information technology systems. Some 
attacks are precise and elegant, such as the Stuxnet cyberweapon used to damage the 
centrifuges in Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Stuxnet targeted specific 
                                               
MONDAY 1–2 (2017), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/8005/6516 
[https://perma.cc/DZ7G-6DXS]. 
8 See, e.g., Robert Kagan, Trump Marks the End of America as World’s ‘Indispensable 
Nation,’ FIN. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/782381b6-ad91-11e6-
ba7d-76378e4fef24 [https://perma.cc/J8QD-TK7F]. 
9 The 2016 attack is merely the latest in a long history of interference. See Morten Bay, 
Fiona Hill’s Story of Russian Disinformation Sounds Very Familiar, SLATE (Nov. 22, 2019, 
1:38 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/11/fiona-hill-russia-disinformation-testimony-
history.html [https://perma.cc/W8MC-6Y2W]; Sean Illing, “Flood the Zone with Shit”: 
How Misinformation Overwhelmed Our Democracy, VOX (Feb. 6, 2020, 9:27 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/1/16/20991816/impeachment-trial-trump-
bannon-misinformation [https://perma.cc/JFQ5-ZPYY]. 
10 See Chad Day & Eric Tucker, Mueller Revealed His Trump-Russia Story in Plain 
View, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 22, 2019), https://apnews.com/3c4bc6e9aa6c4fb18bc9603 
fb082af65 [https://perma.cc/B8LB-LS2J]. 
11 See id. See generally also ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT 
ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
(Mar. 2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/82GF-9HFY] 
(detailing the evidence of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election). 
12 See, e.g., Reese Erlich, Russia Is the Only Winner in Syria, FOR. POL’Y (Oct. 30, 
2019, 9:15 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/30/russia-is-the-only-winner-in-syria/ 
[https://perma.cc/N93G-JZS2]; Sebastian Sprenger, Iran Fallout Deepens Rift Between 
America and Europe, DEFENSE NEWS (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.defensenews.com/global/ 
europe/2020/01/10/iran-fallout-deepens-rift-between-washington-and-europe/ [https://perm 
a.cc/N67C-4RMA]. 
13 See Mark Hensch, US Caught Russian Officials Cheering Trump Win: Report, THE 
HILL (Jan. 5, 2017, 7:52 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/international/russia/312961-us-
caught-russian-officials-cheering-trump-win-report [https://perma.cc/3V72-3TX4]. 
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weaknesses in the Siemens programmable logic controllers and the Microsoft 
Windows print spooler service.14 Some are random, brute force attacks, such as 
fuzzing, which bombards a system with data until one combination causes it to 
break.15 People think Russia used the psychological equivalent of a zero-day attack16 
to influence American voters.17 It is far more likely they engaged in social media 
fuzzing: trying a variety of information tactics,18 and then being pleasantly surprised 
when some of them worked.19 In all likelihood, no one in either the United States or 
Russia knows what vulnerability the attackers exploited or whether the hack can be 
repeated.20 That may make the intervention more frightening. But hacking has much 
to teach about defending against exploits as well.  
                                               
14 See Gregg Keizer, Microsoft Confirms It Missed Stuxnet Print Spooler ‘Zero-Day,’ 
COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 22, 2010, 2:57 PM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/2515 
799/microsoft-confirms-it-missed-stuxnet-print-spooler--zero-day-.html [https://perma.cc/ 
7EMT-US2H]; David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-
ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html [https://perma.cc/WHM7-Y9Y5]; Kim 
Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon, WIRED (Nov. 
3, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/ 
[https://perma.cc/U28C-3XQF]. 
15 See Andy Greenberg, Hacker Lexicon: What Is Fuzzing?, WIRED (June 2, 2016, 
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/hacker-lexicon-fuzzing/ [https://perma.cc/7VZ 
Q-ZPBQ].  
16 See generally FireEye, What Is a Zero-Day Exploit?, 
https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/what-is-a-zero-day-exploit.html [https://perma.cc/ 
6EW5-MRMM] (explaining that a zero-day exploit is an unknown software or hardware flaw 
that can be exploited by attackers before a developer has an opportunity to fix the 
vulnerability).  
17 See, e.g., JAMIESON, supra note 7; Massimo Calabresi, Inside Russia’s Social Media 
War on America, TIME (May 18, 2017), https://time.com/4783932/inside-russia-social-
media-war-america/ [https://perma.cc/4G2V-FSEQ]; Molly McKew, Did Russia Affect the 
2016 Election? It’s Now Undeniable, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2018, 10:25 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/did-russia-affect-the-2016-election-its-now-undeniable/ 
[https://perma.cc/8NUN-UJGP]. 
18 See Abigail Abrams, Here’s What We Know So Far About Russia’s 2016 Meddling, 
TIME (Apr. 18, 2019), https://time.com/5565991/russia-influence-2016-election/ 
[https://perma.cc/T4DT-7EAD]. 
19 See generally Peter Griffin, Hacking the Human: Why Most Cybercrime Doesn’t 
Involve Computer Hacking, NEW ZEALAND LISTENER (Dec. 18, 2019), 
https://www.noted.co.nz/tech/tech-tech/cybercrime-most-doesnt-involve-computer-hacking 
[https://perma.cc/6Q8E-4CS5] (noting that humans are often the weak point in information 
technology ecosystems). 
20 The current (as of this writing) electoral campaign in Great Britain may well provide 
a proving ground for this claim. See Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: U.K. Elections 
Provide Key Test for American Tech Companies’ Efforts to Fight Disinformation, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-
technology-202/2019/12/12/the-technology-202-u-k-elections-provide-key-test-for-americ 
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This Essay attempts three things. First, it examines and questions assumptions 
about the 2016 disinformation campaign through the lens of hacking. Second, it 
looks for other examples—test cases—of successful informational interventions for 
fun and profit. Finally, it closes with suggestions about what voters, governments, 
and platforms can do to reduce the likelihood of future successful attacks. 
 
I.  THE USUAL SUSPECTS 
 
The standard story about Russian intervention is constructed on a number of 
assumptions. These might, or might not, be warranted. But, the point of enumerating 
them is to avoid the mistake of rounding up the usual suspects in response to the 
commission of a crime. No serious commentator doubts that Russia tried hard to 
influence the outcome of the 2016 election.21 Constructing an effective defense, 
though, requires a careful understanding of how they did so and why it worked. 
The first and perhaps most important question is whether Russia’s intervention 
can be successfully replicated.22 Nearly all observers were surprised by the outcome 
of the 2016 presidential race.23 Even the attackers may not know what worked or 
why. If they do, they will certainly attempt to repeat their success. But an 
                                               
an-tech-companies-efforts-to-fight-disinformation/5df1283588e0fa51665c097a/ [https://per 
ma.cc/375X-L4U6]. 
21 There is no shortage of non-serious commentators who doubt Russian interference. 
See, e.g., Catie Edmondson, G.O.P. Senators, Defending Trump, Embrace Debunked 
Ukraine Theory, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03/us/polit 
ics/republicans-ukraine-conspiracy-theory.html [https://perma.cc/R5CR-DGKZ]; Adam 
Gabbatt, Trump Resurfaces Debunked Theory Ukraine Interfered in 2016 Election, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2019, 15:10), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/22/don 
ald-trump-resurfaces-debunked-theory-ukraine-interfered-2016-election [https://perma.cc/ 
9AVA-SD43]. 
22 A second-order question is how to prioritize information-based reforms. Russia’s 
efforts undoubtedly changed votes. So did the near obsession by mainstream media sources, 
such as the New York Times, with ultimately irrelevant questions about Secretary Clinton’s 
private e-mail server. See Erik Wemple, Studies Agree: Media Gorged on Hillary Clinton 
Email Coverage, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2017, 3:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2017/08/25/studies-agree-media-gorged-on-hillary-clinton-email-
coverage/ [https://perma.cc/7XE4-ZXS4]. And so, too, did the transformation of channels 
such as Fox News into de facto agents of the Trump campaign. See generally Garrett M. 
Graff, Fox News Is Now a Threat to National Security, WIRED (Dec. 11, 2019, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/fox-news-is-now-a-threat-to-national-security/ [https://perma 
.cc/7XE4-ZXS4]. Foreign informational interventions might be more effective or more 
objectionable, but advocates of reform should consider that there are limited resources to 
address information problems and prioritize accordingly. 
23 See Hensch, supra note 13. 
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intervention based on, for example, broad exposure and Bayesian learning24 might 
provide little guidance to hackers.  
The second question is how strong an influence the Russian intervention 
exerted. The hacking metaphor assumes that the attacks changed votes—in other 
words, it assumes that, but for Russian efforts, a decisive number of voters would 
have voted for the Democratic candidate instead of the Republican one. However, 
the null hypothesis, despite how depressing observers may find it, is that voters 
preferred Trump to Clinton, even if this meant supporting policies (such as tax cuts 
and reductions in social safety net programs) that might negatively affect their 
economic interests.25 One interesting way of examining this question—if the data 
are available—would be to look at ticket-splitting in social media users and non-
social media users. Controlling for other factors (not an easy task), if social media 
users more often voted for candidate Trump, but Democratic candidates for other 
positions than non-users did, that is at least suggestive of an effect from 
disinformation on social media.26 Internal inconsistencies in voter preferences could 
thus be telling. 
The disinformation campaign also appears to have had multiple goals, some of 
which conflict. For example, it is plain that Russia wanted to create political and 
social discord among Americans, as well as reducing political support for candidate 
Clinton.27 A well-known example is the use of parallel disinformation strategies to 
generate a clash in front of an Islamic center in Houston, Texas. Russian operatives 
set up two opposing Facebook groups, the “Heart of Texas” (which purported to 
resist the “Islamization of Texas”) and the “United Muslims for America” (which 
                                               
24 See, e.g., Jonny Brooks-Bartlett, Probability Concepts Explained: Bayesian 
Inference for Parameter Estimation, TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE (Jan. 5, 2018), 
https://towardsdatascience.com/probability-concepts-explained-bayesian-inference-for-para 
meter-estimation-90e8930e5348 [https://perma.cc/TE82-ARUQ] (providing an explanation 
of Bayesian inference and its underlying theory). An example of a Bayesian technique to 
deal with information problems is filtering of spam e-mail messages. See Pieter Arntz, 
Explained: Bayesian Spam Filtering, MALWAREBYTES LABS (Feb. 17, 2017), 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/security-world/2017/02/explained-bayesian-spam-filtering/ 
[https://perma.cc/F3VQ-JXEK]. 
25 People routinely vote on a heterogeneous set of preferences. A number of studies 
suggest that non-economic factors predominated for key constituencies. See, e.g., Ann M. 
Oberhauser, Daniel Krier & Abdi M. Kusow, Political Moderation and Polarization in the 
Heartland: Economics, Rurality, and Social Identity in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, 
60 SOC. Q. 224 (2019) (analyzing Iowa voters); Tyler T. Reny, Loren Collingwood & Ali A. 
Valenzuela, Vote Switching in the 2016 Election: How Racial and Immigration Attitudes, 
Not Economics, Explain Shift in White Voting, 83 PUB. OPINION Q. 91 (2019) (providing that 
racial and immigration concerns affected the voting behavior of White voters). 
26 Ideally, an assessment would include a wider set of variables, such as whether a user 
saw or “liked” any of the disinformation postings, commented on them, retweeted them, etc.  
27 See MUELLER, supra note 11, at 4, 14. 
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claimed to want to “Save Islamic Knowledge”).28 Each Facebook page called upon 
its followers to engage in a demonstration in front of the Islamic center on May 21, 
2016.29 Only about a dozen protesters supporting the “Heart of Texas” position 
showed up; the crowd of counterprotesters was far larger.30 This effort to intensify 
existing conflicts could be quite successful in heightening tensions and undermining 
social cohesion. But it also seems likely to encourage voter turnout rather than to 
suppress it: people motivated enough to show up for an in-person demonstration are 
likely to be motivated to go to the polls and vote.31 
A third question is whether micro-targeted disinformation is successful without 
the cooperation of members (particularly influential ones) of the targeted group.32 
The Twitter account Blacktivist, set up by Russian Internet operatives, pushed for a 
demonstration in Baltimore on the anniversary of the death of Freddie Gray, who 
died due to mistreatment while in police custody.33 Blacktivist reached out to 
Reverend Heber Brown, III, a Baltimore minister, to try to line him up as a 
supporter.34 Brown, though, resisted Blacktivist’s efforts, concerned that they 
originated outside Baltimore and might undermine local community efforts.35 Social 
media offers a vector for reaching individuals without using traditional channels or 
                                               
28 See Todd J. Gilman, Russian Trolls Orchestrated 2016 Clash at Houston Islamic 
Center, New Senate Intel Report Recalls, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Oct. 8, 2019, 12:56 PM), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2019/10/08/russian-trolls-orchestrated-2016-
clash-houston-islamic-center-senate-intel-report-says/ [https://perma.cc/WDC3-4NGA]. 
29 Claire Allbright, A Russian Facebook Page Organized a Protest in Texas. A Different 
Russian Page Launched the Counterprotest., TEX. TRIBUNE (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/11/01/russian-facebook-page-organized-protest-texas-
different-russian-page-l/ [https://perma.cc/JB93-ERV5]. 
30 See Scott Shane, How Unwitting Americans Encountered Russian Operatives Online, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/us/politics/russian-
operatives-facebook-twitter.html [https://perma.cc/FLX9-74MQ]. 
31 Cf. Stephen Coleman, The Effect of Social Conformity on Collective Voting Behavior, 
12 POLIT. ANALYSIS 76 (2004); Leonie Huddy & Nadia Khatib, American Patriotism, 
National Identity, and Political Involvement, 51 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 63, 73–74 (2007). 
32 See generally Dipayan Ghosh, Banning Micro-Targeted Political Ads Won’t End the 
Practice, WIRED (Nov. 22, 2019, 12:20 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/banning-micro-
targeted-political-ads-wont-end-the-practice/ [https://perma.cc/32B4-B5RK] (discussing the 
response of Facebook, Google, and Twitter toward paid political advertising). 
33 See Jason Parham, Russians Posing as Black Activists on Facebook Is More Than 
Fake News, WIRED (Oct. 18, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/russian-black-
activist-facebook-accounts/ [https://perma.cc/XBC3-FSPG] (discussing how certain groups 
have infiltrated others on social media with fabricated accounts and targeted ads). 
34 See Alison Knezevich & Justin Fenton, ‘Blacktivist’ Account Linked to Russia Raised 
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satisfying traditional gatekeepers. However, disinformation efforts that are not 
successful in persuading key influencers are much less likely to succeed. 
Lastly, the standard narrative on Russian interference in 2016—or, indeed, any 
disinformation effort—relies on an (often unstated) view of what the desired 
outcome should have been. This could be a normative claim: disinformation caused 
American voters to elect a candidate manifestly unsuited for the presidency, or it 
caused parents to avoid vaccinating their children due to fears about potential side 
effects.36 The claims can also be descriptive: positing that disinformation causes 
people to make political, financial, or personal choices that are misaligned with their 
ex ante preferences. Both normative and descriptive claims about disinformation’s 
effects are open to challenge. Normatively, a stable minority of American voters 
(around 40–43%), when polled, strongly support President Trump and his policies.37 
It is possible, of course, that the disinformation is sticky38—it changed voters’ views 
before the election, and those views have remained constant.39 That leads into the 
second challenge: it is not clear why people’s ex ante views create the correct 
baseline for analysis. Those views themselves may have been the product of 
previous informational interventions, and humans generally do not have reliable 
access to their preference ordering (or, perhaps, may not have reliable preference 
orderings). 
These assumptions about Russia’s disinformation intervention may be correct. 
It may be difficult to test or disprove them. But they are worth surfacing as the 
United States tries to prevent future interference in its affairs based on inaccurate 
online information campaigns.40 
                                               
36 See, e.g., Lesley Chiou & Catherine Tucker, Fake News and Advertising on Social 
Media: A Study of the Anti-Vaccination Movement (July 27, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3209929 [https://perma. 
cc/FQ36-BM7M] (studying “the role of social networks and advertising on social networks 
in the dissemination of false news stories about childhood vaccines”). 
37 See How Unpopular Is Donald Trump?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, https://projects.fivethir 
tyeight.com/trump-approval-ratings/ [https://perma.cc/DFR6-KWVF] (last visited Mar. 17, 
2020) (providing “an updating calculation of the president’s approval rating”). 
38 See, e.g., Drew Harwell, Doctored Images Have Become a Fact of Life for Political 
Campaigns. When They’re Disproved, Believers ‘Just Don’t Care.,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 
2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/01/14/doctored-
political-images/ [https://perma.cc/V3RD-ZT2R] (discussing the impact of technology and 
social media on the practice of sharing doctored images of political rivals). 
39 This is plausible: people often evince confirmation bias, where they seek out 
information that reinforces rather than challenges their existing beliefs. 
40 And, as always, there is the risk that reform efforts will be deployed strategically, 
against domestic political opposition, as well as, or instead of, being used against foreign 
interference. See, e.g., Kirsten Han, Want to Criticize Singapore? Expect a ‘Correction 
Notice,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/21/opinion/fake-
news-law-singapore.html [https://perma.cc/U74A-PG9U]. See generally Derek E. 
Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51 (2015) (discussing attempts by several 
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II.  SUCCESSFUL HACKS 
 
Information hacking is neither new nor exclusively human. Animals 
misrepresent information for a variety of reasons.41 Edible butterflies evolve to 
resemble noxious neighbors.42 Fireflies from one species imitate mating signals from 
another, then eat their suitors.43 Cuttlefish change color to improve their odds of 
mating.44 Some disinformation mechanisms in animals are involuntary: butterflies 
that are poor mimics due to genetic chance or development are more likely to 
become prey, and thus less likely to pass on genes.45 Evolution is a harsh judge. But 
some tactics, like those of the cuttlefish, are the result of cognition, and thus fall 
closer to human disinformation strategies.46  
Humans propagate deliberate false information for a variety of reasons as well: 
to amuse, to profit, to obtain power, and to irritate.47 Some examples of successful 
disinformation produce results through a process analogous to evolution: large-scale 
variation over time with a feedback loop sorts winners from losers. For example, 
scammers send out huge numbers of unsolicited e-mail messages promoting a 
variety of penny stocks. Gullible investors buy the stocks—not in great numbers, 
but enough to make the scheme worthwhile.48 The low cost of penny stock tout spam 
means that it does not need to be particularly well-targeted; one study found that 
                                               
state attorneys general to pressure Google into dealing with copyright infringement and the 
content showing up in search results). 
41 For a readable set of examples, see Barbara J. King, Deception in the Wild, 321 SCI. 
AM. 50, 52–53 (2019). 
42 See, e.g., Mitsuho Katoh, Haruki Tatsuta & Kazuki Tsuji, Rapid Evolution of a 
Batesian Mimicry Trait in a Butterfly Responding to Arrival of a New Model, 7 SCI. REP. 
6369, 6369–40 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-06376-9 [https://perma.cc/JX2B 
-Q8TL]. 
43 See, e.g., James E. Lloyd, Aggressive Mimicry in Photuris Fireflies: Signal 
Repertoires by Femmes Fatales, 187 SCI. 452, 452–53 (1975). 
44 See, e.g., Culum Brown et al., It Pays to Cheat: Tactical Deception in a Cephalopod 
Social Signaling System, 8 BIO. LETTERS 729, 730 (2012). 
45 See Katoh, Tatsuta & Tsuji, supra note 42, at 6369–40. 
46 See King, supra note 41, at 54 (also citing example of canines). 
47 See generally Mark Verstraete, Derek E. Bambauer & Jane R. Bambauer, Identifying 
and Countering Fake News (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 17-15, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3007971 [https://perma.cc/5CWT-
6Y33] (classifying different types of fake news).  
48 See Karen K. Nelson, Richard A. Price & Brian R. Rountree, Are Individual Investors 
Influenced by the Optimism and Credibility of Stock Spam Recommendations?, 40 J. BUS. 
FIN. & ACCT. 1155, 1158–61 (2013). 
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spammers can earn over 4% return on this tactic49 (before transaction costs, which 
are low50).  
There are other, more subtle ways to profit from disinformation—ones that 
emphasize the sheer difficulty of categorizing data and motives in this space.51 For 
example, financial analyst Harry Markopoulos, who famously outed the criminal 
conduct by Bernie Madoff,52 issued a recent report stating that General Electric 
(“GE”) was “a bigger fraud than Enron.”53 Markopoulos’s claim rests on a plausible, 
but unlikely, theory that GE has massive undocumented liabilities on its accounting 
books from its long-term care insurance business.54 Markopoulos, though, secretly 
shared his conclusions with an unnamed hedge fund that shorted GE’s stock ahead 
of its release, after shopping the information to three other funds.55 (The stock fell 
by 11% on the day the report debuted.56) In exchange, Markopoulos received a share 
of the fund’s profits from those trades.57 GE has been a case study in 
mismanagement for years, but its accounting is viewed as rigorous by many outside 
accounting experts.58 So, it is possible that Markopoulos is a whistleblower, out to 
save investors from fraud. It is more likely that Markopoulos is trading on his 
Madoff fame to peddle a shoddy theory that makes the market rather than correcting 
it.59 
                                               
49 See Laura Frieder & Jonathan Zittrain, Spam Works: Evidence from Stock Touts and 
Corresponding Market Activity, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 479, 501 (2008). 
50 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Solving the Inbox Paradox: An Information-Based 
Policy Approach to Unsolicited E-mail Advertising, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11–14 (2005). 
51 See Verstraete, Bambauer & Bambauer, supra note 47, at 8–9. 
52 See Shawn Tully, How the Man Who Nailed Madoff Got GE Wrong, FORTUNE (Oct. 
3, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/10/03/ge-accounting-markopolos-madoff/ 
[https://perma.cc/T38K-HUW5]. 
53 See HARRY MARKOPOULOS, GENERAL ELECTRIC, A BIGGER FRAUD THAN ENRON, 
https://fm.cnbc.com/applications/cnbc.com/resources/editorialfiles/2019/8/15/2019_08_15
_GE_Whistleblower_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8CP-LQ94] (last visited Mar. 5, 2020). 
54 See Tully, supra note 52. 
55 See Mark Vandevelde, Harry Markopolos: The Scourge of Madoff Trains His Sights 
on GE, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/243c4728-c00c-11e9-b350-
db00d509634e [https://perma.cc/FE63-DZBE]. 
56 See Tully, supra note 52. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Crediting Markopoulos with unmasking Bernie Madoff may also be inaccurate 
information, likely due to hindsight bias. For any investor or firm of any size, there will be a 
Cassandra or two who claim that the operation is a sham. This is also what makes Michael 
Lewis’s book THE BIG SHORT an analytical disappointment: there is insufficient evidence 
that his protagonists were insightful, rather than lucky, in predicting the weakness in the 
home mortgage market and collateralized debt obligations. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, 
THE BIG SHORT (2010); but cf. generally JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, A MATHEMATICIAN PLAYS 
THE STOCK MARKET (2003) (explaining how popular investment approaches and theories are 
incorrect and unable to help an investor, even a professional mathematician, make sense of 
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People also lie to increase their chances of mating.60 Men misrepresent 
themselves as taller than they actually are.61 Women claim to be younger.62 
Everyone lies about their income and uses photos of their younger selves as profile 
pictures.63 Disinformation works: a study by the online dating site OkCupid showed 
that reported income was positively correlated with the number of messages a user 
received, especially for men.64 It may be difficult to detect inaccurate information—
requests for a bank statement on a first date are likely to be received poorly—or liars 
may be exploiting transaction costs. Luring a potential partner into communication, 
or an in-person meeting, gives the deceiver a chance to make a good impression on 
other grounds or to perpetuate the fiction.65 
Sometimes, the goal of disinformation is expressive, not pecuniary: to advance 
a particular normative view or to undermine one. The online movie review site 
Rotten Tomatoes changed its crowdsourced ratings feature to prevent fake pre-
release reviews that targeted movies such as Captain Marvel, Star Wars: The Last 
Jedi, and Black Panther.66 Online critics—trolls, more accurately—attacked these 
                                               
the stock market and accurately predict its movements). Put colloquially, every year amateur 
basketball fans place bets (many illegal) on a sixteenth-seeded team to upset a first-seeded 
team in the NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship. Such an upset has occurred once, when 
the University of Virginia lost to the University of Maryland – Baltimore County in 2018. 
The governor of Maryland, Larry Hogan, had UMBC defeating Virginia in his bracket. See 
Michelle R. Martinelli, Maryland Governor, Senator Predicted UMBC’s Upset and Picked 
Retrievers as National Champions, USA TODAY (Mar. 17, 2018, 12:51 AM), 
https://ftw.usatoday.com/2018/03/umbc-maryland-baltimore-county-upset-uva-virginia-nc 
aa-tournament-march-madness-prediction-larry-hogan-chris-van-hollen [https://perma.cc/ 
7RAS-NS4G] (showing that Gov. Hogan was right but would be an unlikely source of future 
wagering advice for NCAA bracket lovers).  
60 See generally Irina D. Manta, Tinder Lies, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 207 (2019). 






65 See Brian Fung, OkCupid Reveals It’s Been Lying to Some of Its Users. Just to See 
What’ll Happen., WASH. POST (July 28, 2014, 11:57 AM MDT), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/07/28/okcupid-reveals-its-been-lying-to-some-of-its-
users-just-to-see-whatll-happen/ [https://perma.cc/9HEC-ADUH] (describing experiments 
OkCupid conducted on its users that showed users were more likely to respond to messages 
and exchange contact information with another user when OkCupid removed the profile 
photo of the user making the initial contact). 
66 George Nash, Rotten Tomatoes Rescues Captain Marvel from Review Trolls, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/film/2019/feb/27/rot 
ten-tomatoes-captain-marvel-brie-larson-review-trolls [https://perma.cc/G5FX-BH73]; see 
also Alex Abad-Santos, How Captain Marvel and Brie Larson Beat the Internet’s Sexist 
Trolls, VOX (Mar. 11, 2019, 11:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/culture/2019/3/8/18254584 
/captain-marvel-boycott-controversy [https://perma.cc/YK6A-TBZP]. 
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films for purportedly advancing a political agenda by casting women and people of 
color in lead roles.67 The short-run mechanism was financial; if the movies tanked 
at the box office, perhaps Hollywood’s studios would return to reserving key 
positions for white men.68 But the trolls would receive no monetary compensation 
even if they succeeded. Instead, their objective was less tangible: to resist calls for 
more diversity both in motion pictures and in the journalists who cover them. Aided 
by the Rotten Tomatoes change and a tweak to YouTube’s algorithm,69 Captain 
Marvel triumphed over the trolls, earning over $153 million in its opening weekend 
and over $1.1 billion in revenues worldwide during its release.70 But films such as 
the all-female Ghostbusters remake suffered from trolling,71 and similar online 
complaints appear to have led Disney to jettison the initial script for the final Star 
Wars movie, The Rise of Skywalker.72 Disinformation may thus use money as a lever 
rather than as a goal. 
                                               
67 See Abad-Santos, supra note 66. 
68 See Yohana Desta, Rotten Tomatoes Is Fighting Back Against White Nationalist 
Black Panther Trolls, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood 
/2018/02/rotten-tomatoes-black-panther-facebook-group [https://perma.cc/K54S-GRH6] 
(reporting on organized efforts by white nationalists to write trolling film reviews on Rotten 
Tomatoes). 
69 James Hale, Here’s How YouTube Fought ‘Captain Marvel’ Trolls, TUBEFILTER 
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.tubefilter.com/2019/03/08/heres-how-youtube-fought-captain-
marvel-trolls/ [https://perma.cc/Z66V-MYP3]. 
70 Captain Marvel (2019), THE NUMBERS, https://www.the-
numbers.com/movie/Captain-Marvel-(2019)#tab=summary [https://perma.cc/MMK5-
Z9DC]. 
71 See Emma Grey Ellis, Trolls Are Boring Now, WIRED (Mar. 13, 2019, 11:22 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/trolls-are-boring/ [https://perma.cc/7LHU-UENL] (explaining 
that the tactics that failed against Captain Marvel worked with great effect to damage the 
box office success of the new, all-female version of Ghostbusters). 
72 See Alex Abad-Santos & Alissa Wilkinson, Star Wars: The Rise of Skywalker Was 
Designed to Be the Opposite of The Last Jedi, VOX (Dec. 27, 2019, 12:20 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/culture/2019/12/27/21034725/star-wars-the-rise-of-skywalker-last-
jedi-j-j-abrams-rian-johnson [https://perma.cc/75C3-HWFS] (discussing the online backlash 
against the trilogy’s previous installment, The Last Jedi, and explaining how The Rise of 
Skywalker seems to reflect that Disney was aware of the criticism and made changes in 
response) ; Britt Hayes, Turns Out Colin Trevorrow’s Version of Star Wars: Episode IX Was 
Good, Actually, AV CLUB (Jan. 14, 2020, 2:32 PM), https://news.avclub.com/turns-out-
colin-trevorrows-version-of-star-wars-episod-1841002112?fbclid=IwAR0kdfhnxbvXBBJs 
HkOu6MNhpVytk_ZkUw-9NhojqZW5-f0th9UqibkXCi0 [https://perma.cc/4B45-KFXP] 
(discussing the plot points of the original script for Episode Nine of the Star Wars film 
franchise that was rejected when J.J. Abrams was brought back as the director and co-writer 
of The Rise of Skywalker); Brian Lowry, ‘The Rise of Skywalker’ Takes Flight After the Rise 
of the ‘Star Wars’ Trolls, CNN (Dec. 13, 2019, 12:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/13 
/entertainment/star-wars-trolls-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/6HQ7-KTK8] (noting the 
rise in vitriolic trolling regarding the Star Wars franchise, including “evidence of deliberate, 
organized political influence measures disguised as fan arguments”). 
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The prevalence of prevarication strategies may seem depressing.73 However, 
these case studies offer a set of testbeds for potential interventions, as well as 
enabling after-action analysis of efforts that did not work. 
 
III.  HACKING BACK 
 
Cybersecurity offers a number of lessons for how to respond to information 
hacking.74 Unfortunately, some of these lessons concern the limits of preventing and 
remediating hacks. But dispelling false hope is a service in itself. These insights can 
be summarized in three key points. First, preventing information hacks is difficult if 
not impossible. Second, remediating hacks shows more promise, but recovery tends 
to be unpleasant and expensive, particularly for political issues. Finally, while 
educating users is a perennially popular solution, it is an illusory one that may 
actually be counterproductive. 
 
A.  The Limits of Prevention 
 
Cybersecurity demonstrates the profound challenges of preventing successful 
attacks, which should induce skepticism about most current approaches to 
disinformation.75 Blocking attacks is a popular strategy for computer security. It 
                                               
73 See generally Dawn Carla Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1519 (2019) (describing how bad actors continue to interfere with the 
marketplace(s) of ideas). 
74 See generally Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Cybercom Contemplates Information Warfare 




75 Most of the political discourse about disinformation on social media platforms results 
in pressure on these firms to purge their sites of deliberately inaccurate data. See, e.g., Brian 
Fung, Facebook to Ban Census Suppression on Its Platforms, CNN (Dec. 19, 2019, 11:37 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/19/tech/facebook-census-suppression-policy/index. 
html [https://perma.cc/7YPA-JAVU]; Oliver Milman, Defiant Mark Zuckerberg Defends 
Facebook Policy to Allow False Ads, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2019, 9:19 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/dec/02/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-policy-
fake-ads [https://perma.cc/554S-VER5]. Most scholarly reform proposals also concentrate 
on blocking or removing suspect information, often by imposing liability on platforms. See 
generally Annemarie Bridy, Remediating Social Media: A Layer-Conscious Approach, 24 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 193, (2018) (providing a high-level regulatory history of online 
speech and arguing that “adopting a must-carry obligation for social media platforms is not 
what the Internet needs”); Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not 
Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017) (arguing 
that statutory protections for websites are overly broad under the Communications Decency 
Act); Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (To American Democracy), 
16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200 (2017) (analyzing the costs associated with the rise of speech 
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explains why users and organizations are admonished by security experts to patch 
their systems, run intrusion detection and anti-virus software, filter e-mail messages 
for phishing attempts, share information about threats, and inculcate users with 
caution about all things Internet.76 Yet systems are continually compromised due to 
misconfiguration, complexity, and simple human gullibility.77 Prevention is 
conceptually simple but difficult in implementation. 
Information problems are even harder to prevent. Patching humans is much 
more difficult than patching software. Behavioral economics has identified a number 
of cognitive human biases and traits that can be exploited by attackers.78 However, 
even when we know, for instance, that hindsight bias is in play, it is hard to 
ameliorate.79 These neurological characteristics are susceptible to hacks precisely 
because they are persistent. This is one of the challenges of efforts to educate people, 
or to shift social norms in other ways, in response to attacks. Education operates on 
the implicit assumption that human behavior can be altered in a particular direction 
with sufficient effort and focus.80 Cybersecurity research demonstrates the faulty 
                                               
on the internet and social media and its effects on American democracy); Alexander Tsesis, 
Social Media Accountability for Terrorist Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 605, 610–11 
(2017) (arguing that criminal liability “would be the most effective means of addressing the 
dissemination of extremist digital communications”); Cass R. Sunstein, Falsehoods and the 
First Amendment (Preliminary draft 7/25/19, July 29, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3426765 [https://perma.cc/3W3Z-SPVU] (arguing that the 
government should have authority to control fake content and that social media platforms 
should do more to control the same). 
76 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DHHS OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS, HIPAA SECURITY RULE CROSSWALK TO NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK (Feb. 
22, 2016), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/nist-csf-to-hipaa-security-rule-crosswalk-
02-22-2016-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8E5-DHU3]. 
77 See generally Mark Evans et al., Human Behavior as an Aspect of Cybersecurity 
Assurance, 9 SECURITY COMM. NETWORKS 4667 (2016) (proposing a framework for 
cybersecurity assurance); see also Micke Ahola, The Role of Human Error in Successful 
Cyber Security Breaches, USECURE (Oct. 18, 2019, 9:46 AM), https://blog.getusecure.com/ 
post/the-role-of-human-error-in-successful-cyber-security-breaches [https://perma.cc/33EQ 
-3DBX]; Martin Kaste, Cybercrime Booms as Scammers Hack Human Nature to Steal 
Billions, NPR (Nov. 18, 2019, 5:32 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/18/778894491/cyber 
crime-booms-as-scammers-hack-human-nature-to-steal-billions [https://perma.cc/C8YN-
WPSL]. 
78 See, e.g., Victoria Fineberg, BECO: Behavioral Economics of Cyberspace 
Operations, 2 J. CYBER SEC. & INFO. SYS. 20 (2016). 
79 See, e.g., Neal J. Roese & Kathleen D. Vohs, Hindsight Bias, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCH. 
SCI. 411, 417–19 (2012). 
80 There may be some hopeful examples. See, e.g., Eliza Mackintosh, Finland Is 
Winning the War on Fake News. What It’s Learned May Be Crucial to Western Democracy, 
CNN (May 2019), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/05/europe/finland-fake-news-intl/ 
[https://perma.cc/4C8F-BQ6C]. There are some nascent public-sector efforts in the U.S., 
although it is not clear how they will be implemented. Yael Grauer, Arizona Now Has a Task 
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optimism at play in educational efforts.81 Security experts have been trying to get 
computer users to change how they interact online for years, with little success: 
people still click suspicious links in e-mail messages, open attachments, reuse 
passwords across websites, connect freely to public wireless networks that lack 
encryption, and generally engage in other risky behaviors despite ongoing 
informational campaigns.82 
Moreover, even limited success may pay major dividends for attackers. 
Compromising a single computer or user account in an organization can enable 
malicious actors to expand their control rapidly and widely.83 Similarly, in a close 
election, disinformation efforts that affect only a small fraction of voters could prove 
decisive. The heterogeneous preferences of voters present a wide array of weakness 
that information hacking can exploit. This makes defensive efforts much more 
difficult. Attackers always have the advantages of time, numbers, and the initiative. 
They are highly motivated—by the prospect of political gain, financial benefit, or 
both. Some hacks require substantial expertise to execute successfully. But with both 
information and cybersecurity attacks, some can be packaged or automated in a way 
that allows less-skilled actors to mount successful interventions.84 
In short, determined attackers enjoy significant advantages in hacking humans 
and computers alike. Preventing exploits is an appealing but unrealistic option.85 
  
                                               
Force Focused on Countering Disinformation, SLATE (Dec. 18, 2019, 7:30 AM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2019/12/arizona-task-force-disinformation-judicial-system. 
html [https://perma.cc/Q27L-Z7J4]. 
81 See Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1043–47 
(2014). 
82 See, e.g., Michael Greene, The Password Reuse Problem Is a Ticking Time Bomb, 
HELP NET SECURITY (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/11/12/pass 
word-reuse-problem/ [https://perma.cc/9AYU-EWP3]; Kaste, supra note 77; CowBear 
Bebop, How to Secure Your Customers’ Data Over Insecure Public Wi-Fi, TUNNELBEAR 
BLOG (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.tunnelbear.com/blog/how-to-secure-your-customers-
data-over-insecure-public-wi-fi/ [https://perma.cc/M8YG-5N7M]; Successful White House 
Spear Phishing Attacks Show No One Is Safe, GRAPHUS BLOG (Jan. 21, 2020), 
https://www.graphus.ai/successful-white-house-spear-phishing-attacks-show-no-one-is-
safe/ [https://perma.cc/XR4V-Q79M]. 
83 See, e.g., Michael Kassner, Anatomy of the Target Data Breach: Missed 
Opportunities and Lessons Learned, ZDNET (Feb. 2, 2015, 4:29 PM), 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/anatomy-of-the-target-data-breach-missed-opportunities-and 
-lessons-learned/ [https://perma.cc/9KQM-WUMP]. 
84 See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive 
Reasons: Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 
1333, 1350 n.43 (2006) (discussing “script kiddies”). 
85 See, Bambauer, supra note 81, at 1019–20 (arguing that preventing exploitation is 
inevitably futile). 
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B.  The Costs of Remediation 
 
A more promising alternative to preventing attacks is to undertake measures 
that reduce their effectiveness or mitigate their impacts. These range from the 
simple—backing up data and practicing recovery procedures—to the complex—
using techniques such as air gaps between key networks and the public Internet,86 or 
ensuring that an organization uses heterogeneous operating systems and applications 
to prevent a single exploit from devastating a monoculture computing environment. 
These methods are often effective, but they are also expensive, sometimes slow, and 
raise hard questions about determining what data can be treated as accurate. For 
example, the city of Baltimore, Maryland has already spent over $18 million to 
reconstruct its information systems after a pair of ransomware attacks crippled its 
public services infrastructure.87  
Disinformation can also be addressed after the fact. Intermediaries such as 
journalistic organizations can opine on the accuracy of information on-line, and 
platforms can mark it as suspect, redirect users to other sources, or take the data 
down. Voters can cease supporting a candidate or cause, and in some instances may 
be able to act politically, such as via recall efforts, impeachment, or ballot referenda. 
A major challenge for remediation of information hacking is that the time 
window for doing so is often limited. Voters who learn that they have relied upon 
disinformation in making their selections at the ballot box have little if any hope of 
changing their decisions. America does not reboot elections. Similarly, most 
vaccines must be administered within a given period of time, especially for children. 
Once that period passes, the vaccine will have less efficacy, if any. Policy decisions 
such as addressing climate change have longer time frames for intervention, but here 
too, scientists warn that some global effects are already irreversible on any 
meaningful scale and that others will soon become so.  
There are also familiar obstacles from cybersecurity to mitigation tactics. One 
method is to identify sources of suspect information or to block them altogether. 
Attribution, however, is a long-standing challenge online. Users can migrate 
accounts, use automated methods such as bots to disseminate information, or rely 
on fellow travelers to post their messages.88 And attackers may well pose as 
defenders, reporting other users (including accurate sources of information) as 
suspect both to impede their efforts and to disguise their own malfeasance.89 These 
problems with identifying disinformation via source rather than content also affect 
                                               
86 See Zetter, supra note 14 (describing how Stuxnet bridged the air gap between Iran’s 
nuclear centrifuges and the publicly-connected Internet).  
87 See Bruce Sussman, Baltimore, $18 Million Later: ‘This Is Why We Didn’t Pay the 
Ransom,’ SECUREWORLD (June 12, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.secureworldexpo.com/ 
industry-news/baltimore-ransomware-attack-2019 [https://perma.cc/J3LY-GZ67]. 
88 See Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 589–90, 595–98 (2011). 
89 See MARTIN C. LIBICKI ET AL., RAND, THE DEFENDER’S DILEMMA: CHARTING A 
COURSE TOWARD CYBERSECURITY 26 (2015), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ 
research_reports/RR1000/RR1024/RAND_RR1024.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5ZG-82FB]. 
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the prospect of information sharing to address disinformation. A given source may 
have different names on different sites, may use tactics such as Virtual Private 
Networks to conceal their origin, and may attempt to set up their own third-party 
verifiers or certifiers (a process known as astroturfing or greenwashing).90 
There are similar challenges for information sharing efforts about suspect 
content. This type of collaboration has been popular in American cybersecurity 
efforts in both the public and private sectors.91 A panoply of intermediaries has been 
created to distribute information about vulnerabilities, threats, exploits, and 
safeguards.92 However, organizations on different systems may find this data to be 
of limited value—if a firm’s web server runs the Linux operating system, data about 
Windows bugs will not help much. And even when an entity has timely, accurate 
data about a threat, it may lack the resources to mitigate it. Purchasing new systems 
takes time and resources, as does patching existing ones. Smaller organizations may 
not have the necessary expertise to react quickly or may not have an accurate picture 
of what comprises their information technology environment. 
Thus, a combination of legal and practical constraints cabins the potential for 
remediation or mitigation techniques to address information hacking. 
 
C.  The Illusory Promise of Education 
 
One well-worn approach to cybersecurity issues is education.93 By training 
users to be more sophisticated and skeptical about their interactions with information 
technology, attacks such as spearphishing94 and password guessing will become less 
likely to succeed. This approach is popular because it is seemingly straightforward 
and not particularly costly.95 In addition, it serves a valuable function in the political 
economy of apportioning responsibility for disinformation problems and fixes. 
However, as appealing as education is, it is unlikely to succeed. Moreover, 
educational efforts about disinformation may, ironically, serve the second-order 
goals of attackers by weakening people’s perceptions of the competence and efficacy 
of key societal institutions.96 
                                               
90 See Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 439–41 (2009). 
91 See Derek E. Bambauer, Sharing Shortcomings, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 465, 465–67 
(2015). 
92 Id. at 469. 
93 See, e.g., ELIZABETH BODINE-BARON ET AL., COUNTERING RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA 
INFLUENCE, RAND 46–50 (2018), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_ 
reports/RR2700/RR2740/RAND_RR2740.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB43-BKRA]. 
94 See GRAPHUS BLOG, supra note 82. 
95 See Bambauer, supra note 81, at 1043–45. 
96  See Mark Verstraete & Derek E. Bambauer, Ecosystem of Distrust, 16 FIRST AMEND. 
L. REV. 129, 142 (2018). 
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Educational efforts are nothing new; calls for greater media literacy have a long 
history.97 Online information sharpens the problem since authors and distributors 
can evade identification and attribution with greater ease than in offline contexts.98 
And, with the rise of communication channels such as e-mail and social media 
platforms, attackers can increasingly tailor informational efforts to increase their 
perceived credibility, to leverage human cognitive biases, and to appear as though 
they originate from a trusted source.99 Security education has sought to teach users 
to avoid attachments sent via e-mail or other mediums from an unknown source.100 
But if they appear to come from a known and trusted source, users are more likely 
to lower their guard. For example, Jeff Bezos of Amazon had his phone hacked when 
he received malware over the WhatsApp application from the crown prince of Saudi 
Arabia.101 And the computer security firm RSA was hacked when an employee 
opened what appeared to be a spreadsheet from inside the company that announced 
their bonus; the file was, in fact, a virus that enabled attackers to exfiltrate sensitive 
data.102 Wariness about unknown sources may be achievable, but it is difficult to 
convince people to maintain skepticism when information seems to originate from 
a trusted source. Thus, creating more sophisticated and literate online information 
consumers is a laudable goal but one that is quite hard to achieve. 
Emphasizing education to combat disinformation may have at least two 
undesirable consequences. First, it alters the political economy of interventions by 
shifting focus from creators or distributors of inaccurate information to consumers 
of it. Users as a whole are an amorphous group and lack an organized entity to 
                                               
97 These are increasingly translated to the online context. See, e.g., Natascha A. Karlova 
& Karen E. Fisher, A Social Diffusion Model of Misinformation and Disinformation for 
Understanding Human Information Behaviour, 18 INFO. RES. 573 (2013), 
http://www.informationr.net/ir/18-1/paper573.html#.XpUka8hKjZs [https://perma.cc/9V6T 
-HKEQ]. 
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QYB7] (including comments on the internet and security issues dealing with authors, bots, 
and trolls distributing misinformation in a way not easily negated by current solutions). 
99 See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Researchers Uncover RSA Phishing Attack, Hiding in Plain 
Sight, WIRED (Aug. 26, 2011), https://www.wired.com/2011/08/how-rsa-got-hacked/ 
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represent their interests in these debates. Educational efforts implicitly shift the 
blame to users for undesirable outcomes and can thus reduce pressure for measures 
that treat other players in the information ecosystem. Second, if educational efforts 
succeed, they are likely to do so by increasing skepticism about information sources, 
even ones that are familiar. This runs the risk of continuing a decades-long trend of 
decreasing American faith in social, political, and journalistic institutions.103 Such 
cynicism is, overtly, a goal of the Russian disinformation campaign.104 Educational 




Cybersecurity offers a useful framework and some helpful cautionary tales for 
efforts to address disinformation online. It also suggests a few models for 
interventions that may help.105 This section describes quarantines, critical (human) 
infrastructure, and whitelists as potential interventions that hold promise. 
One possibility is for Internet platforms to increase their curation of 
information, including in some cases by quarantining it. Google and YouTube 
provide a model for this behavior. Historically, Google has been reluctant to alter 
the output from its organic search based on its PageRank algorithm.106 However, the 
search firm has reacted to problematic search entries in at least two ways. First, 
Google de-lists material that it has categorized as consisting of child sexual abuse 
images, terrorist content, and privacy-invading disclosures.107 Those websites 
remain available, but their removal from search results makes them harder to find as 
a practical matter. Second, and more interestingly, Google itself intervenes 
                                               
103 See Verstraete & Bambauer, supra note 96, at 142. 
104 See, e.g., Fighting Russian Disinformation, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 30, 2019), 
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105 This section describes the interventions based on their potential efficacy. It does not 
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algorithm via search engine optimization. See Segal, supra note 106; see also Jennifer M. 
Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under 
Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 
626 (2006) (providing analysis of notices of Google’s notice-and-takedown procedure used 
to gain safe harbor protection under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act). 
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occasionally when disinformation or other suspect data is highly ranked.108 For a 
period of time, the top search result for queries about the term “Jew” was a white 
supremacist organization.109 Google did not remove the result but instead added a 
warning—a text box next to the result explaining what it was and why it had risen 
to the top of the firm’s results.110 Platforms are already under pressure to adopt the 
first tactic by removing problematic posts and links, but the rapid mutation of 
Internet information makes it difficult for social media sites to keep up. The second 
tactic has not been widely utilized thus far, but it holds at least some promise. In its 
strong form, platforms could replace known disinformation with accurate 
information on the same topic. In a milder version, sites could add context and 
disclaimers when users post problematic links or share disinformation. These moves 
are fraught for platforms because they must make express value judgments and 
thereby invite criticism. However, even if sites stuck to relatively obvious 
disinformation (for example, posts that mention the terms “Obama,” “birth 
certificate,” and “Kenya,” or ones that reference Pizzagate),111 that would represent 
significant progress. 
A second effort flows from network theory.112 Either online or offline, key 
influencers could be trained to spot disinformation and to intervene. This is a form 
of targeted user education that is focused; it effectively deputizes certain people in 
the hunt for bad data. It will require some work to identify who the critical nodes are 
in a given social network. However, if attackers continue to engage in micro-
targeting of important or vulnerable groups, that will narrow the set of people who 
should be trained. This intervention is modeled on successful offline interactions, 
such as the use of partnerships with barber shops to educate black heterosexual men 
                                               
108 Google and Microsoft Agree Steps to Block Abuse Images, BBC NEWS (Nov. 18, 
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POLITICO (Sept. 16, 2016, 3:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/birther-
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about the risk of HIV/AIDS.113 There are already organic examples, such as 
Reverend Brown’s skepticism about the efforts of the purported Blacktivist group to 
generate conflict on the anniversary of the death of Freddie Gray.114 Network theory 
suggests both a rationale for this intervention and a mechanism for it. It posits that 
certain people are key nodes that connect other people to one another, making them 
valuable for distributing accurate information or blocking disinformation.115 Second, 
its analytical tools can enable platforms or researchers to assess the links among 
users, such as Facebook friendships, to discover who these key influencers are.116 
Lastly, platforms could use whitelists—known sources of information that is 
generally accurate—to encourage users to share links to or data from reliable outlets. 
YouTube employed this technique to combat fake reviews about and attacks on 
actress Brie Larson during Captain Marvel’s run in theaters.117 By designating the 
search term “Brie Larson” as newsworthy, YouTube altered its algorithm to 
prioritize results from trustworthy news sources.118 This technique would need to be 
modified for platforms that are not centered around a search function. One 
possibility is that social networking sites could designate a set of key topics or terms, 
such as “Brie Larson” or “Pizzagate.” If their users post links to articles from 
whitelisted sources, those posts would appear immediately. Posts from non-
whitelisted sources might be delayed in appearing on the platform, either to enable 
further investigation of their accuracy or simply as a mechanism for encouraging 
users to rely on more trusted sources in their information distribution. 
These tactics may be helpful in reducing the effects of disinformation, 
particularly on Internet platforms. However, it is important to acknowledge that the 
success of disinformation results from a larger set of social forces, particularly the 
breakdown of trust in previously respected gatekeepers.119 These larger trends may 
or may not be reversible, but we cannot effectively combat disinformation without 
addressing them. 
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